NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Volume 83 | Number 3

3-1-2005

Hard Law Firms and Soft Law Schools
Robert M. Lloyd

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Robert M. Lloyd, Hard Law Firms and Soft Law Schools, 83 N.C. L. Rev. 667 (2005).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr/vol83/iss3/4

This Comments is brought to you for free and open access by Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in North
Carolina Law Review by an authorized administrator of Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
law_repository@unc.edu.

Article 4

HARD LAW FIRMS AND SOFT LAW SCHOOLS
ROBERT M. LLOYD*

In his acclaimed book, Hard America, Soft America:
Competition vs. Coddling and the Battle for the Nation's Future,
political analyst Michael Barone tells how the reemergence of a
culture that demands performance and rewards individual initiative
transformed America, lifting the country out of the malaise of the
1970s and creating the basis for the growth and prosperity of today.'
Barone divides institutions into two kinds: Hard institutions and Soft
institutions. Hard institutions, which Barone refers to as "Hard
America," subject individuals to competition and accountability!
Barone
Soft institutions do not-they provide for everyone.'
Hard
acknowledges that we need both types of institutions.
institutions earn the money that not only pays their own members but
also supports the Soft institutions. Soft institutions provide a safety
net. We need Soft institutions that can do such things as care for
children and the elderly.4 But when Softness begins to permeate all
types of institutions, it threatens our society.5
This Essay analyzes Barone's ideas in the context of twenty-first
century law practice. It concludes that American law practice, like
American business, has become Harder in recent years. At the same
time, American law schools have become Softer. The result is that
law schools are doing a poor job of preparing students for practice.
As Barone tells it, the social and economic history of the
Lindsay Young Distinguished Professor of Law, University of Tennessee College of
Law. B.S.E., 1967, Princeton University; J.D., 1975, University of Michigan. This Essay
benefited from the suggestions of Tom Davies, Chris Day, Brannon Denning, Larry
Dessem, Tom Galligan, Joan Heminway, George Kuney, Don Leatherman, Deanna
Lloyd, Donna Looper, Nick McCall, Tom Plank, Glenn Reynolds, Greg Stein, and James
Weiss. Lee Baldridge and Chris Sanders provided excellent research assistance, and the
University of Tennessee College of Law supported my work through a summer research
grant.
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1. MICHAEL BARONE, HARD AMERICA, SOFT AMERICA:
CODDLING AND THE BATTLE FOR THE NATION'S FUTURE 14 (2004).

COMPETITION VS.

2. Id. at 13. Barone capitalizes "Hard" and "Soft," and uses them almost as terms of
art. For this Essay, I have chosen to do the same.
3. Id. at 13-14.
4. Id. at 15-16.
5. Id.
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twentieth century is the story of how America, which was a Hard
world at the beginning of the century, developed a destructive culture
of Softness in the middle and late parts of the century, only to be
saved from a looming disaster by a new Hardening toward the end of
the century.
The world of 1900 was a Hard world with few safety nets. As
Barone describes it:
On the farm, where most Americans still lived, you depended
on the year's harvest and fluctuating crop prices. In the rapidly
growing big cities you lived bunched together: in many
neighborhoods there were more people than rooms. Onequarter of urban Americans never married, as compared to just
8 percent today. Many men did not marry because they could
not support a family; they lived with their parents or as
boarders in other people's houses and found sexual release with
prostitutes.
Work was available, but difficult. Employers could dismiss
you for any reason. If you were injured, there was no recourse:
you could sue for damages, but courts usually found
contributory negligence. The death of a breadwinner was
disaster for a family ....
As the century progressed, our society was able to protect its
members from much of the harshness. Government programs
provided a safety net.7 Unfortunately, society Softened in other ways
as well, ways that were less beneficial. Businesses consolidated,
creating large corporations,8 which quickly grew bureaucratic and
demanded less of their employees.9 At the time, it seemed like a
good thing. Life became easier for the employees, and lack of
competition allowed corporations to pass the costs of this inefficiency
on to consumers. 10
6. Id. at 18-19 (endnotes omitted).
7. See id. at 29. Among these programs, which we take for granted today but which
were quite controversial when first proposed, were the Social Security Act, passed in 1935,
and the Fair Labor Standards Act, passed in 1938. The Social Security Act, in addition to
establishing old-age pensions, provided monthly payments to single mothers with children,
while the Fair Labor Standards Act established the national minimum wage and the fortyhour work week. It also outlawed child labor. Id.
8. BARONE, supra note 1, at 30-33.
9. Id. at 32-35.
10. Id. at 35, 67; see also BEN HAMPER, RIVETHEAD: TALES FROM THE ASSEMBLY
LINE 37, 54-59 (1991) (describing widespread on-the-job drinking among auto plant
workers); id. at 59-62 (explaining the practice of "doubling up" in which one worker did
two jobs while his partner slept or left early).
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The Softness spread to other parts of society. Government
became big, bloated and inefficient. The public schools became
undemanding, indulging in every educational fad," while passing
Not until later did anyone other than a few economic theorists realize the
consequences of what was happening. Unions forced the large corporations to pay their
employees better, but for those outside the protection of the big business/big labor
detente, prices rose faster than incomes. See Kay E. Anderson et al., Measuring UnionNonunion Earnings Differences, MONTHLY LABOR REV. 26, 26, 28 (June 1990); Wages vs.
Inflation, 1964-92, at http://reagan.webteamone.com/wages-vs-inflation.html (last visited
Feb. 5, 2005) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review). Because corporations grew
Soft, producing overpriced, poor-quality goods, it was easy for foreign competitors to gain
a foothold in the country. See BARONE, supra note 1, at 66 (describing increased
competition from foreign cars in the American automobile market). What was more
important for the long term was that the Softness gave people a sense of entitlement that
stifled their drive for education. During the first part of the twentieth century, the
dominant cultural theme had been work hard and get a good education because that was
the way to lift yourself to (in the language of the time) a "better station in life."
During the fifties and sixties, a person with a high school education could go to
work on an assembly line, earn more money than a college-educated teacher, and expect
to retire at age fifty-five with a nice benefits package. BARONE, supra note 1, at 112, 149;
see also HAMPER, supra, at 44 (recalling experience as an assembly line worker: "It
seemed like every time I turned around, the paymaster was stuffin' another wad of
currency into my waistband."). Young people grasped the lesson: you do not need to
work in school. By virtue of being an American, you are entitled to a good job. See id. at
53-55 (reporting that auto workers viewed education as "crap," and college as "sissy"); id.
at 69 (characterizing a layoff from General Motors' assembly line as loss of a "birthright"
of "hefty wages for idiot labor"). This attitude has not changed, and it is one reason
politicians and news commentators can excite audiences by crying about jobs going
overseas but cannot arouse interest in education improvement programs that will keep us
competitive. By way of contrast, a leading business magazine ran a picture of Indian
outsourcing billionaire Azim Premji with a caption stating that Mr. Premji "thinks
Americans need to study harder." Justin Fox, Where Your Job Is Going, FORTUNE, Nov.
24, 2003, at 84.
11. BARONE, supra note 1 at 59-60. Illustrating the point is a joke that has been
circulating among those in higher education who deal with the products of this school
system:
Teaching Math in 1950: A logger sells a truckload of lumber for $100. His cost of
production is 4/5 of the price. What is his profit?
Teaching Math in 1960: A logger sells a truckload of lumber for $100. His cost of
production is 4/5 of the price, or $80. What is his profit?
Teaching Math in 1970: A logger exchanges a set "L" of lumber for a set "M" of
money. The cardinality of set "M" is 100. Each element is worth one dollar.
Make 100 dots representing the elements of set "M." Set "C," the cost of
production, contains 20 fewer points than set "M." Represent set "C" as a subset
of set "M" and answer the following question: What is the cardinality of the set
"P" of profits?
Teaching Math in 1980: A logger sells a truckload of lumber for $100. His cost of
production is $80 and his profit is $20. Your assignment: Underline the number
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students who did not perform and refusing to reward students who
did.12 Crime rates skyrocketed. 3 Welfare evolved from a safety net
to a culture of dependency. 4 Even the military became Soft. 5
Because the country was so prosperous, we were able to ignore

for a time the consequences of all this Softening. But eventually they
The Soviets shocked us by
became impossible to ignore.
outperforming us in space, first beating us to launch a satellite, then
putting a human in orbit before we could. 6 Vietnam showed the
effects of a Soft military strategy.17 Crime, much of it the result of
Soft welfare policies, made cities unlivable. 8 Most dangerous of all,

our economy, which had provided the resources to sustain our
lifestyle in spite of all the Softening, began to falter.
These consequences finally shocked Americans into action, but
the reaction did not happen all at once.
Instead, different

constituencies attacked different aspects of the Softening with
different degrees of enthusiasm and with different degrees of success.
What was similar about these reforms, however, was that most of
them were motivated by self-interest. People saw that the Softening
was hurting them and their families, and they decided to do
something about it. The Hardening process was most successful in
the economy, and for this Barone gives the government a great deal
of the credit. In the late 1970s the American economy was stuck in
20.
Teaching Math in 1990: By cutting down beautiful forest trees, the logger makes
$20. What do you think of this way of making a living? Topic for class
participation after answering the question: How did the forest birds and squirrels
feel as the logger cut down the trees? There are no wrong answers.
Teaching Math in 2000: A logger sells a truckload of lumber for $100. His cost of
production is $120. How does Arthur Andersen determine that his profit is $60?
12. BARONE, supra note 1, at 13-14, 24-27, 35.
13. Id. at 53. For example, the number of violent and property crimes per capita rose
143% from 1960 to 1970 alone. Id. Barone attributes this in part to Soft attitudes that
failed to hold criminals responsible for their conduct, id. at 53-54, and in part to welfare
policies that resulted in larger numbers of children growing up fatherless. See id. at 56
(reporting that fatherless male children were much more likely to commit crimes than
those who grew up in a home with two parents).
14. Id. at 56 (reporting that welfare dependency approximately tripled between 1965
and 1975).
15. Id. at 126-31 (describing strategies without clear goals, personnel policies based
on political expediency, and commanders out of touch with battlefield realities).
16. Id. at 45.
17. Id. at 123-31.
18. Id. at 53-56.
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what economists took to calling "stagflation," a condition by which
the country suffered from both high inflation and economic
stagnation, a combination traditional Keynesian economics thought
could not exist. Many thought this signaled America's fall into
permanent economic decline.19 After years of ineffective policies to
deal with this malaise, the federal government finally moved
forcefully, not only cutting taxes and expanding the money supply,
but, more important for the long term, deregulating many industries."z
Deregulation of industries such as trucking, airlines, and
telecommunications meant that companies in those industries could
21
no longer pass on the costs of their inefficiencies to their customers.
They had to cut the flab.
19. Id. at 75. A review of contemporary books on economic policy indicates that, if
anything, Barone understates how pessimistic people were. The gloom-and-doom crowd
included such luminaries as Lester Thurow, Dean of the M.I.T. School of Management,
who published a book in 1980 with the title The Zero-Sum Society. In it, he expressed the
pessimism of the times: "At the end of the 1970s our political economy seems paralyzed.
The economy is stagnant, with a high level of inflation and unemployment. Fundamental
problems, such as the energy crisis, exist but cannot be solved. We have lost the ability to
get things done." LESTER C. THUROW, THE ZERO-SUM SOCIETY 24 (1980). Referring to
"Seemingly unsolvable problems were emerging
1979's energy crisis, he wrote:
everywhere-inflation, unemployment, slow growth, environmental decay, irreconcilable
group demands, and complex, cumbersome regulations." Id. at 3. He lauded Germany
and Japan as examples of economies that had outperformed the United States, not so
much in spite of as because of their higher taxation rates and their more pervasive
government regulation. Id. at 5, 7.
For an even more negative view of the American economy during the 1970s, see
generally HARRY MAGDOFF & PAUL M. SWEEZY, THE END OF PROSPERITY: THE
AMERICAN ECONOMY IN THE 1970s (1977) and EDWARD F. RENSHAW, THE END OF
PROGRESS-ADJUSTING TO A NO-GROwTH ECONOMY (1976).
Ironically, since these books were written, the economy of the United States has
grown far more rapidly than the economies of Germany and Japan. Those two nations, as
well as the other nations of the original European Union, are facing long-term economic
crises because their lagging economies cannot support the generous social programs their
citizens have come to think of as a birthright. BARONE, supra note 1, at 76.
20. Although Republicans like to take credit for the benefits of deregulation, a great
deal of American business deregulation took place during the Carter administration.
BARONE, supra note 1, at 78, 80. For example, Ralph Nader and Senator Edward
Kennedy were instrumental in the deregulation of the trucking industry, see id. at 77-80,
and a federal judge appointed by Jimmy Carter was the prime mover in
telecommunications deregulation. See id. at 80-81.
21. See id. at 80-82. What happened to the airlines is a good example. Prior to
deregulation, all airline routes and fares had to be approved by the Civil Aeronautics
Board ("CAB"). Id. at 78. The result was that there was no price competition. Airlines
flew half-empty planes, and the CAB set fares high enough to allow them to make profits
on these half-empty planes while paying wages and salaries that made their employees
objects of envy. To support this, the fares had to be so high that air travel was a luxury
most Americans could not afford. Many of the airlines' current problems can be traced to
the era of regulated fares. See Flynn McRoberts, United's Undoing. A War Within, CHI.
TRIB., July 13, 2003, § 1, at 1.
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A new wave of entrepreneurs Hardened the economy even
more. Innovators like Sam Walton, Bill Gates and FedEx founder
Fred Smith refused to believe the conventional wisdom that no one

could challenge the dominant large corporations.22. They beat their
Soft competitors by creating new ways of doing business, validating
Joseph Schumpeter's theory of the "creative destruction" by which
the economy renews and improves itself. 23 But this was not all the
They also created within their
new business leaders did.

organizations a Hard corporate culture that allowed them to stay
successful long after the advantage of their initial breakthrough had
dissipated. 24 These firms became models that other organizations,
even their competitors, used to Harden themselves.
The threat of corporate takeovers, made possible by changes in

capital markets, was the final blow to corporate Softness. For the first
seventy years of the twentieth century, the growing trend had been

for large corporations to be run for the benefit of management at the
expense of the shareholders. 25 Rather than trying to maximize return
to shareholders, management tried to minimize the hassles inherent
in their jobs while they collected very comfortable salaries.2 6 It took
22. There is irony here. The term "conventional wisdom" was coined in the 1950s by
Harvard economist John Kenneth Galbraith. See JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH, THE
AFFLUENT SOCIETY 6-17 (1958). Galbraith later wrote that entrepreneurs, having been
replaced by large corporate bureaucracies, were no longer a factor in the economy. JOHN
KENNETH GALBRAITH, THE NEW INDUSTRIAL STATE, 91-103 (4th ed. 1985).
23. See JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM AND DEMOCRACY 81-86

(3d ed. 1950).
24. BARONE, supra note 1, at 83-85.

25. Interestingly, Adam Smith had predicted this conflict two hundred years earlier.
See ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF

NATIONS 264-65 (Edwin Cannan ed., University of Chicago Press, 1976) (1776). Smith
believed that hired managers would not bring the same "anxious vigilance" as managers
who owned the company. "Negligence and profusion, therefore, must always prevail...."
See id.
For a complete explanation of the way management became separated from

ownership in American corporations, see generally Christian C. Day, Partnerto Plutocrat:
The Separation of Ownership from Management in Emerging Capital Markets-19th
Century Industrial America, 58 U. MIAMI L. REV. 525 (2004). The classic work on the
tension between the interests of corporate shareholders and those of management is
ADOLPH A.

BERLE &

GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION

AND

PRIVATE PROPERTY (1932).
26. See, e.g., Alfred Rappaport, Executive Incentives vs. CorporateGrowth, HARv. Bus.
REV., July-Aug. 1978, at 81, 81-84 (explaining that management's incentive-based
compensation plans, including bonuses, emphasized short term results at the expense of
"continuing vitality," a crucial shareholder objective). Admittedly, the salaries of the time
were very reasonable in comparison with the excessive compensation being awarded
corporate executives at the end of the century. See Even Higher Society, Even Harderto
Ascend, ECONOMIST, Jan. 1, 2005, at 22 (reporting that thirty years ago the top one
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corporations. Once this began, corporate managers were forced to
trim the fat. If they did not, the stock price would be lower than it
should be, and there would be others trying to take the company over
and get rich on the price increase that would occur when they
squeezed out the fat and raised profits to where they should be.27
The classic example was RJR Nabisco, described by Wall Street
Journal writers Bryan Burrough and John Helyar in Barbariansat the
Gate. 8
Before the buyout, the company's management was
incredibly Soft. They seemed to spend more time partying, golfing,
and playing office politics than actually running the company.29
Management effected extravagant waste such as the RJR Air Force, a
fleet of corporate jets so ostentatious that when it was sold after the

buyout, potential buyers shied away because they did not want their
shareholders to see them in such planes.30

And there was Team

Nabisco, a group of twenty-nine sports stars who received a total of
seven to ten million dollars a year for doing little more than
schmoozing with management. 3' Management intentionally wasted

money this way, reasoning that if profits started to go up,
shareholders would expect them to keep going up. Meeting these
expectations would cut into management's comfortable lifestyle, so
the easiest course was to keep profits low.32 The debt load the

company took on in the leveraged buyout imposed the only
discipline.33 Other corporations, however, saw what was coming and

hundred chief executives were paid thirty-nine times the average worker's pay, while those
today are paid more than one thousand times the average worker's pay). Barone could be
criticized for presenting only the benefits of the changes in corporate culture. Those
changes also led to the excesses of the late 1990s. But he probably made the right choice
in his emphasis; the excesses of Tyco, Enron and the like are getting more than enough
attention in other quarters. Barone is pointing out that the discipline imposed by the
takeover movement helped to avoid an economic disaster that was more of a possibility
than most people are aware (or at least willing to admit).
27. See BARONE, supra note 1, at 90-94; Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel A. Fischel,
The Proper Role of Target's Management in Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 HARV. L.
REV. 1161, 1173-74 (1981).
28. BRYAN BURROUGH & JOHN HELYAR, BARBARIANS AT THE GATE: THE FALL
OF RJR NABISCO (Harper Perennial ed. 1991).
29. See id. at 73-74, 79-80, 90-98, 115, 119-21,365.
30. See id. at 94-95, 210; BellSouth Buys "Taj Mahal" of Corporate Hangars, CHI.
TRIB., Dec. 7, 1993, at Bus. 1.
31. BURROUGH & HELYAR, supra note 28, at 365. Team Nabisco member Jack
Nicklaus received a million dollars a year, and for this he was not even willing to play golf
with the company's best customers. Id. at 95-96.
32. Id. at 365.
33. Id. at 510.
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attributes much of the economy's recovery to this Hardening."
Two important institutions that Barone does not discuss are law
schools36 and the practicing bar. An analysis of these institutions
through Barone's Hard/Soft lens shows how law schools have lost

touch with reality.
Law practice in the middle of the twentieth century was
relatively

Soft.

37

It did not seem that way to those of us who were

associates at the time, but it was.38 There certainly were Hard aspects
to it--competition for jobs at top firms was intense,3 9 and associates
34. See BARONE, supra note 1, at 82-88.

35. See id. Barone could be criticized for failing to discuss the human costs of this
Hardening. But that aspect of the process has received more than its share of discussion
elsewhere. One can hardly watch a television news program or read a local newspaper
without seeing a story about lost jobs and cast-off workers. Exporting America, Lou
Dobbs' series decrying the loss of jobs overseas, has run on CNN so long that it has
become something of a joke. A Wall Street Journal article pointed out that in his position
as the author of an investment newsletter which retails for $199 a year, Mr. Dobbs
recommends the stocks of some of the same companies he criticizes in his role as a
newscaster. James Bandler, Is Lou Dobbs Of Two Minds On "Offshoring?", WALL ST. J.,
June 21, 2004, at B1. It appears that in his role as a newscaster Mr. Dobbs likes Soft
policies, but as a financial advisor, where he is himself subject to accountability of a sort,
he advises his paying clients to put their money in companies that pursue Hard policies.
36. In talking of the Softening of education, Barone states, incorrectly as far as law
schools are concerned, that it has not extended to professional schools. BARONE, supra
note 1, at 148.
37. See MARC GALANTER & THOMAS PALAY, TOURNAMENT OF LAWYERS: THE

TRANSFORMATION OF THE BIG LAW FIRM 36 (1991) (observing that large law firms
"could all but ignore such boorish concerns as efficiency, productivity, marketing and
competition" (quoting MARK STEVENS, POWER OF ATTORNEY: THE RISE OF THE GIANT

LAW FIRMS 9 (1987))).
38. I saw the first part of the Hardening process first hand. In 1975, 1 joined a firm of
forty-three lawyers, then considered a large firm. The firm had offices in only one city,
Los Angeles. It was very much like a family. It prided itself on the fact that every lawyer
in the firm had joined it directly after law school or military service. Every associate had
an expectation of partnership, and for many years no partner left the firm except due to
death or retirement.
I left the firm in 1983, shortly after being elected a partner. The firm then had 100
lawyers in four California cities. Associates were no longer being told that if their work
was satisfactory they could expect to become partners. The firm hired partners and senior
associates from other firms, and some partners left to join other firms. The firm now has
more than 400 lawyers in nine cities, including New York and Washington.
Since leaving practice I have remained in contact with many of my former
colleagues, some of whom have stayed with the firm and some of whom have moved to
other firms, large and small. I also speak regularly with lawyers practicing in firms of all
sizes. The observations I make in this Essay are based in part on my personal experience
and my conversations with practicing lawyers, and except as otherwise noted, they are
entirely consistent with the published accounts of law practice that I have been able to
find.
39. See PAUL HOFFMAN, LIONS IN THE STREET 133 (1973) (describing large firm
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had to perform in order to make partner. 40 But even so, the
competition for partnerships was far less brutal than it is today.4
Firms saw themselves as families (not always happy families, but
families nonetheless).42 They hired as associates only people they
wanted to have as partners, and they expected that these people
would eventually become partners in the firm.43 Making partner took
a lot of hard work, but if the associate performed up to expectations,
he or she (usually a he) could expect a partnership at the end of six or
seven years." Once the lawyer became a partner, the pressure
diminished.45 In the same way, partners did not leave firms for betterpaying jobs at other firms.46 Work was plentiful for large firms, and
clients, although they seemed demanding at the time, demanded far
less than today's clients demand. They wanted high quality work, and
they wanted it done quickly, but cost control was not an issue. I often
had clients ask, "Can't you get more people working on it?"
Cost control was not an issue because corporate America was
still Soft enough that no one was keeping a close eye on legal fees.47
recruiting).
40. See id. at 129-32 (describing associate workloads).
41. See, e.g., GALANTER & PALAY, supra note 37, at 63 (discussing study indicating
more than half of lawyers joining large Chicago firms prior to 1975 became partners at
original firm); HOFFMAN, supra note 39, at 6 (describing Cravath firm philosophy of hiring
and promoting lawyers on the basis of legal ability, not business development).
42. See, e.g., HOFFMAN, supra note 39, at 60 (explaining that many large firms did not
have written partnership agreements because partners trusted each other); MARY ANN
GLENDON, A NATION UNDER LAWYERS: HOW THE CRISIS IN THE LEGAL PROFESSION
IS TRANSFORMING AMERICAN SOCIETY 21 (1994) (noting that large firm partners gave

up all compensation to avoid laying off associates, and partners at one firm made
accommodations for an associate with an embarrassing psychiatric problem); id. at 26
(observing an "extraordinary sense of fellowship" in one seventy-lawyer firm);
GALANTER & PALAY, supra note 37, at 28-29 (reporting that firms maintained ties with
passed-over associates).
43. See supra note 38. There were exceptions, primarily in New York. But in the rest
of the country, this was the norm.
44. This was not the case in the large New York firms. See, e.g., GALANTER &
PALAY, supra note 37, at 26-27 (citing various sources estimating proportion of associates
in New York firms who made partner from one in six to one in twelve).
45. See Peter W. Bernstein, Profit Pressures on Big Law Firms, FORTUNE, Apr. 19,
1982, at 84, 100 ("Partnership used to be for life .... "). A 1989 article stated that attaining
partner status "conveys lifetime tenure." Ronald J. Gilson & Robert H. Mnookin,
Coming of Age in a CorporateLaw Firm: The Economics of Associate Career Patterns,41
STAN. L. REV. 567, 571 (1989). This trend had already begun to change when the Gilson
& Mnoonkin article was published, but it is clearly correct as to the way things had been in
the past.
46. See HOFFMAN, supra note 39, at 60-61; cf. GALANTER & PALAY, supra note 37,
at 54 (citing a 1998 survey of 500 largest law firms finding that at more than one-quarter of
those firms, more than half the partners had been hired from other firms).
47. See GALANTER & PALAY, supra note 37, at 34 (attributing corporations' failure to
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The people hiring the lawyers wanted the job done right-that
affected their performance rating. But for the most part, nobody was
looking at the way the legal fees affected the bottom line.48 Some
businesses, particularly closely-held businesses, scrutinized legal fees,
but overall, the atmosphere was such that one lawyer could say to me:
"The only clients I want are people who open my bill, write 'pay this'

on it, and send it to the accounting department."

Another firm

bragged internally that it would take on only clients who paid by
return mail with no questions asked.49

Competition for clients was very low key. 0

Clients did not

change lawyers,5 1 and lawyers did not spend a great deal of effort
trying to attract clients that were already attached to other firms.52
Lawyers talked about rainmaking, but in those pleasant days,
rainmaking consisted of genteelly developing personal relationships
that might or might not someday develop into long-term lawyer-client
relationships.53 Nobody thought of approaching somebody else's
client with a proposal to do the work more cheaply. And they
certainly did not worry that another firm would approach their clients
with similar proposals. 4
All this was, of course, too good to last. Entrepreneurial lawyers
saw the opportunity and built Hard firms which took business from
the Soft firms and made their founders wealthy.5 5 For some time
question legal bills to high profit margins and lack of foreign competition).
48. See Nat Slavin, The Never-Ending Quest for Legal Alternatives, CORP. LEGAL
TIMES, Feb. 2004, at 4 (reporting that corporations demanded the best legal services
money could buy and were willing to pay the rates charged).
49. Cf. JAMES B. STEWART, THE PARTNERS: INSIDE AMERICA'S MOST POWERFUL
LAW FIRMS 376-77 (1983) (describing large law firms of the time setting billing rates by
fiat, as opposed to the way they are set in competitive markets).
50. See HOFFMAN, supra note 39, at 71-72 (noting that talking about clients and fees
was considered ungentlemanly, and that one firm considered business cards unethical).
51. See id. at 72 ("In the blue-chip bar client shifts are rare.").
52. See id. at 61 (describing clients as "locked in" to law firms).
53. See id. at 87-93 (describing rainmaking in the Soft era).
54. Discussing the way things have changed, a partner in a large firm wrote:
[There is a] tendency for
in looking for new client
many years ago arguably
disciplinary committees.
services.

firms to become much more competitive and aggressive
opportunities. Lawyers today are doing things that not
could have landed them squarely before bar association
All of us are looking for new ways to market our legal

James F. Fitzpatrick, Legal Future Shock: The Role of Large Law Firms by the End of the
Century, 64 IND. L.J. 461, 466-67 (1989).
55. See, e.g., PAUL HOFFMAN, LIONS OF THE EIGHTIES 109-12 (1982) (describing the
rise of Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom); cf. HOFFMAN, supra note 39, at 53 (1973
book by same author quoting lawyers on how easy it is to make money as a partner in a
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now, law firms have been competing for clients in a manner that the
partners of the Softer times would describe as vicious. 5 6 To meet
competition, firms have to make associates pay for themselves right
from the beginning. Firms expect associates to come in the door with
the knowledge and skills to handle business deals and litigation
matters with minimal supervision. 7 Associates are expected to
understand that meeting deadlines is not optional-performance, not
excuses, is required. 8

Unfortunately, today's Soft law schools do not prepare their
graduates for this reality. In most law schools, performance is
optional. While the practice of law has been getting Harder, law
schools have been getting Softer.
American law schools have Softened themselves in a variety of

ways. Most obviously, they have softened the curriculum. In many
large firm, but stating that partners' incomes are low in comparison to those of business
people).
The classic account of the Hard law firm culture is Patrick J. Schiltz, On Being a
Happy, Healthy, and EthicalMember of an Unhappy, Unhealthy, and Unethical Profession,
52 VAND. L. REv. 871 (1999).
56. See, e.g., Schiltz, supra note 55, at 888-89 (describing an "increased pressure to
attract and retain clients in a ferociously competitive marketplace"). Lawyers even use
vicious language to describe their competition. Many law firms pride themselves on
having an "eat what you kill" compensation system, meaning that the partners who bring
in the business get the money. See, e.g., GLENDON, supra note 42, at 24 (noting the
significance of the language); GALANTER & PALAY, supra note 37, at 52 (describing how
"eat what you kill" is replacing compensation systems based on equality or seniority).
Law firms are hiring sales professionals and setting up sales departments (usually,
but not always, calling them business development departments, rather than using "the
unsettling S-word"). Marie Beaudette, The Sales Call, LEGAL TIMES, May 24, 2004, at 1;
see also GALANTER & PALAY, supra note 37, at 53 (reporting that in 1989 almost 200
firms had marketing directors).
57. See William R. Trail & William D. Underwood, The Decline of ProfessionalLegal
Training and a Proposalfor Its Revitalization in ProfessionalLaw Schools, 48 BAYLOR L.
REV. 201, 225 n.113 (1996); GLENDON, supra note 42, at 27 (attributing decline in training
to competition for clients and higher starting salaries). Although most law firms claim to
provide training for associates, the kind of one-on-one mentoring that was common in the
past is disappearing from large law firms. In the past, time spent training associates was
'written off or hidden in the time billed clients on large matters. In today's competitive
environment, this can no longer be done. See Schiltz, supra note 55, at 926-28. Moreover,
what training is given is not allocated uniformly. A disproportionate share goes to those
associates who have already shown themselves to be partnership material. Id. at 928
n.301.
58. See GLENDON, supra note 42, at 28. It is not only associates who are expected to
perform. Today's law firms place incredible pressure on partners and sanction those
partners who fail to perform. One large law firm was even investigated for age
discrimination after it demoted thirty-two partners for shortcomings in performance. See
EEOC v. Sidley Austin Brown & Wood, 315 F.3d 696, 698 (7th Cir. 2002); see also
GALANTER & PALAY, supra note 37, at 67-68 (noting that partners who fail to perform
may be "de-equitized," "departnerized," or "pushed off the iceberg").
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schools, courses which emphasize political and cultural trends, not
5
legal analysis, constitute a large portion of upperclass offerings.

1

Law schools give students incentives to prefer these Soft courses. The
Soft courses are usually taught in small sections, so a student who
wants to take a course in Dickens and the Law6 gets the opportunity
to interact with a professor in a small group, whereas a student who
wants to learn income tax or business associations is stuck in a large
class.61 The Softer courses usually have papers or take-home finals, so
the students are not actually forced to learn a body of material. And
the average grades are higher in the Softer classes.62 With so many
59. See, Trail & Underwood, supra note 57, at 214-17; James J. White, Letter to Judge
Harry Edwards, 91 MICH. L. REV. 2177, 2182-83 (1993); see also GLENDON, supra note
42, at 202 (asserting that many new courses as well as " 'lite' versions of standard items"
are being added to "the old menu of heavy legal dishes"); cf. id. at 217-18 (finding that
many candidates for law teaching positions took few "law courses" in law school beyond
the required first-year curriculum).
Much of the growth in Soft courses is due to a system of "academic courtesy" that
allows professors to design courses to fit their own interests and social agendas. See Trail
& Underwood, supra note 57, at 214. Professor James J. White explains: "Particularly at
elite law schools the curriculum fits the fancy-some might say the whim-of the faculty. I
perceive no particular political bias in our selection of courses, only laissez-faire carried to
the point of irresponsibility." White, supra note 59, at 2181.
This trend has been noted even outside the legal community. See Charles
Rothfeld, What Do Law Schools Teach? Almost Anything, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 23, 1988, at
B8 (highlighting a Yale Law School course described as "an investigation of disputing,
dispute processing and social structure in Iceland of the saga age, with side glances at
contemporary kin-based cultures"). The situation has progressed to the point that while
the curriculum of national law schools is not tied to the law of any particular state, the
curriculum of elite law schools "is not tied to the law of any particular planet." James D.
Gordon, III, How Not to Succeed in Law School, 100 YALE L.J. 1679, 1684 (1991). While
Professor Gordon is obviously joking, the joke is funny only because it contains an
element of truth.
60. This was the title of a course offered at Harvard Law School. RICHARD D.
KAHLENBERG, BROKEN CONTRACT: A MEMOIR OF HARVARD LAW SCHOOL 134-43

(1992). Most law schools have similar courses. Whether any of them serve beer as was
done at Harvard, see id. at 138, 141, is not clear.
61. See, e.g., University of Tennessee College of Law, Spring 2003 Grade Distribution
Report (July 9, 2003) [hereinafter Tennessee Grade Report] (listing 82 students in
Commercial Law, 55 in Business Associations, 18 in Women and the Law, and 14 in
Jurisprudence) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review); University of Nebraska
College of Law, Grade Distributions (Spring 2004) (listing 77 students in Wills & Trusts, 7
in Jurisprudence, and 8 in Topics in Law and Psychology) (on file with the North Carolina
Law Review). The tradition of teaching the more substantive upperclass courses in large
sections apparently began when these courses were required of all students. See PETER
DEL SWORDS & FRANK K. WALWER, THE COSTS AND RESOURCES OF LEGAL
EDUCATION: A STUDY IN THE MANAGEMENT OF EDUCATIONAL RESOURCES 177

(1974) (reporting that until the early- to mid-1970s most law schools required a number of
now-elective upperclass courses such as Commercial Transactions and Federal Income
Taxation).
62. At my institution, a report showing the average grade in each course is circulated
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Soft courses available, professors in these courses are in the position
of having to compete for students. These courses, which most often
center around the professor's research or social agenda, face
cancellation if they do not attract enough students.6 3 So professors
compete with high grades and low demands.
The Soft courses allow students to use what Mary Ann Glendon
has referred to as "verbal acrobatics," ' rather than Hard legal
analysis, and we have to accept the fact that law schools attract people
who prefer verbal acrobatics to rigorous analysis. Medical schools,
business schools and graduate programs in engineering and the
physical sciences attract many of the college graduates with the
analytical skills prized by law firms. So they are not in the law school
applicant pool. A huge percentage of students applying to law
schools come out of undergraduate programs that have been dumbed
down to make it easier for their graduates to get into law schools.65
Perverse incentives abound here. Many colleges and universities
to the faculty at the end of each semester. These show the grade disparity very clearly: in
Spring 2003, 14 of 18 upperclass exam-graded courses had a mean grade below 3.3, while
only one of 16 paper-graded classes had a mean grade below 3.3. See Tennessee Grade
Report, supra note 61. All of the anecdotal evidence from other law schools confirms that
higher average grades in Softer courses is a universal (or near universal) phenomenon in
American law schools. For example, one U.S. News top-fifty law school provided me with
a semester grade report listing two seminars in which all students received A's
(confidential report on file with the North Carolina Law Review). While some of this
grade disparity is due to schools giving more grading discretion in smaller classes and nonexam-based classes, many schools have actually mandated higher mean grade ranges in
"seminars." See, e.g., William and Mary School of Law GradingPolicy (last visited Feb.
23, 2005) (exempting classes of fewer than thirty students from mandatory grading curve),
http://www.wm.edu/law/academicprograms/regulations/grading.shtml
(on file with the
North Carolina Law Review). A great deal of hard data show that this is also the case in
undergraduate courses. See Valen E. Johnson, An A Is an A ...And That's the Problem,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 14, 2002, at 4A-14. One study showed that the average grade in elective
courses was 3.54 in humanities, 3.40 in social sciences, and 3.05 in natural sciences and
math. Id. This actually understates the difference in grading standards because the
departments that gave the highest grades attracted the least qualified students (as
measured by SAT scores and high school grade point averages). See id.
63. The professor whose Soft course is canceled will often have to teach a Hard
course, which usually takes more work and is less interesting to the professor. See
GLENDON, supra note 42, at 222-29 (noting trend toward hiring and promoting law
professors whose primary interests are in fields other than law).
64. The term Professor Glendon uses is "verbal acrobats," describing those who
engage in the practice. GLENDON, supra note 42, at 203. Those who are less charitable
call it "bullshit."
65. A paper published by the American Academy of Arts and Sciences noted that
"institutions that resisted grade inflation found that their graduates had a more difficult
time being accepted into graduate programs." See HENRY ROSOVSKY & MATTHEW
HARTLEY, EVALUATION AND THE ACADEMY:

(2002).

ARE WE DOING THE RIGHT THING? 10
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have departments that depend for their viability on students planning
to attend law school.66 Demanding courses will scare away students;

they might hurt the grade point average. So these departments are
under pressure to lower the demands on their students. Students in
the natural sciences and other rigorous disciplines we might like to
see better represented in law schools are not given this easy pass. Not
only are the courses they take more rigorous, but there is less grade

inflation in the natural sciences.67 The result is that the numbersdriven admissions policies most law schools use 68 screen out the very
students we need to give our classes a better leavening of people with
strong analytical skills.69

This leads to a vicious cycle. The admissions process fills law
schools with students who have weak analytical skills. Because these

people prefer Soft courses, student demand allows law schools to
offer more Soft courses.7" What is worse, it puts pressure on
professors to water down previously Hard courses, turning courses

that once required (and therefore of necessity, taught) analytical
thinking into courses that require nothing more than an exercise of
memorizing majority and minority rules. All of this makes law school
66. Political science produces far more law school applicants than any other
undergraduate major. In the 2002-03 academic year, more than 15,000 political science
majors applied to law schools. This was almost as many as the combined total of the next
three most common majors: English (6,300), Psychology (5,200) and History (4,800). See
LAW SCHOOL ADMISSION COUNCIL, NATIONAL STATISTICAL REPORT: 1998 THROUGH
2003, A-6 to A-8 (2004).
67. See supra note 62.
68. See LAW SCHOOL ADMISSION COUNCIL & AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION,
OFFICIAL GUIDE TO ABA-APPROVED LAW SCHOOLS (2004) (featuring

ABA-LSAC

charts showing likelihood of acceptance at law schools on basis of LSAT scores and
undergraduate grade point averages).
69. The composition of the LSAT contributes to this as well. As Professor Glendon
notes, all of the math questions have been eliminated from the LSAT, and the number of
questions testing logical-analytical skills has been reduced. GLENDON, supra note 42, at
202. The result is that "the LSAT ignores certain types of intelligence that become
increasingly important when law graduates take their places in a society that has more
urgent need for creative problem solvers than for verbal acrobats." Id. at 203.
Others have noted a lack of analytical skills among law students. See, e.g., Michael
Jordan, Law Teachers and the Educational Continuum, 5 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 41, 69
(1996) (noting that "high level analytical skills are presently in short supply in law
schools").
70. Another reason there is such demand for Soft courses is that many law school
students come to law school not out of a passion to practice law, but simply because they
do not know what else to do with their undergraduate liberal arts or social science degrees.
See GLENDON, supra note 42, at 200-01; see also John M. Conley, How Bad Is It Out
There?: Teaching and Learning About the State of the Legal Profession in North Carolina,
82 N.C. L. REV. 1943, 1978 n.201 (2004) (stating that, in the author's experience, all
medical students want to be doctors but many law students do not want to be lawyers).
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more attractive to people who have not developed their analytical
skills.71
The first year curriculum is supposed to overcome the fact that
incoming students have weak analytical skills and to teach them to
"think like a lawyer." 2 It no longer does this. The traditional
Socratic method, where the professor not only questioned the student
on the material he was to have read but questioned the assumptions
underlying the material and even the assumptions behind the
student's own belief system, has vanished from American law
schools.73 Critics have attacked it as too intimidating, too adversarial,
and too demeaning,74 ignoring the fact that the practice of law, for
which law school is supposed to prepare its graduates, has become
more intimidating, more adversarial, and, for those who cannot meet
the new demands, more demeaning.7 5
71. An often-ignored side effect of the failure to teach hard analytic skills is that
lawyers will no longer ascend to positions of leadership in business and community
activities in the way they once did. In the past, lawyers were sought out for positions of
leadership because they had the Hard thinking skills that others lacked. See, e.g., David C.
Hardesty, Jr., Leading Lawyers: An Essay on Why Lawyers Lead America, W. VA.
LAWYER, Apr. 1997, at 26 (claiming that lawyer skills "translate themselves into
marketable skills for the leader"), available at http://www.wvbar.org/barinfo/
lawyer/april97.htm (on file with the North Carolina Law Review); cf. GLENDON, supra
note 42, at 280-88 (stating that lawyers are no longer as capable as leaders but attributing
it to other factors). We could truthfully tell students contemplating law school that their
legal education would be valuable to them in any business or social endeavor. But the
more we Soften the curriculum, the more difficult it is to make this sales pitch with a clear
conscience. See GLENDON, supra note 42, at 201 (noting that for many who came to law
school without definite plans to practice law "the vaunted flexibility of their degrees is not
flexible enough," and that some become "discontented practitioners" while others
continue to "drift").
72. "Analytic skills are typically taught at law school, and in the aggregate, constitute
what is commonly referred to as 'thinking like a lawyer.' " James R.P. Ogloff et al., More
Than "Learningto Think Like a Lawyer": The EmpiricalResearch on Legal Education,34
CREIGHTON L. REV. 73, 227 (2000). A survey of lawyers who graduated from law school
in the 1960s and 1970s found that respondents considered analytical thinking the most
important skill taught in law school. Robert Stevens, Law Schools and Law Students, 59
VA. L. REV. 551, 593 (1973).
73. See infra note 76 and accompanying text.
74. See, e.g., Jennifer L. Rosato, The Socratic Method and Women Law Students:
Humanize, Don't Feminize, 7 S.CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN'S STUD. 37, 42 (1997) (reporting
critics' conclusions that the Socratic method makes classroom experience "traumatizing,
painful and humiliating to all students"); Alan A. Stone, Legal Education on the Couch, 85
HARV. L. REV. 392, 407-08 (1971) (summarizing views of students and other writers).
75. For a number of reasons, the discussion above has focused on large firms. My
experience has been with large firms, published accounts usually deal with large firms, and
large firm practice provides a certain anonymity which makes its veterans more willing to
talk openly. Nevertheless, the available data, as well as anecdotal evidence, indicate that
practice in small and medium-sized firms, corporate law departments, and even
government and public interest law offices has Hardened as well. See GALANTER &
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allow them to slide by with answers from one of the commercial
products that provide "canned briefs"-analyses of the cases and

problems in the leading casebooks-or from a set of course notes
prepared by prior years' students.77 Sets of course notes with analyses
PALAY, supra note 37, at 18-19; GLENDON, supra note 42, at 87.

It could hardly be
otherwise, given that large firms and small firms often compete for the same clients as well
as for the same legal talent. Professor John Conley's study of North Carolina firms
demonstrates this very well:
While large firms are but one segment of the legal community, the way that they
conduct their business may have a ripple effect that is felt throughout the
profession. A partner in a [North Carolina] statewide firm captured the point
nicely. She observed that until the last few years, the pace of practice in her city
had been somewhat more sedate than in Charlotte, a difference that could be
tolerated within a multi-city firm. Now, however, she believes that banking
practice in Charlotte has reached levels of onerousness and profitability that are
unprecedented for this state. Consequently, she reported, big-firm banking
lawyers are demanding increases in compensation that are equally unprecedented
(and that apparently go beyond simply eating more of what they kill). To meet
these demands, her firm now requires more work from all its lawyers, even in the
formerly sleepy provincial offices. The implication is that in the end, lawyers in all
kinds of firms must work harder to compete. When big firms sneeze, in other
words, the whole profession catches cold.
Conley, supra note 70, at 1986 (footnote omitted); see also GALANTER & PALAY, supra
note 37, at 2, 40 (stating that large firms are receiving an increasing share of legal services
expenditures and are setting standards for other firms). Moreover, it has been predicted
that professional services firms combining legal services with other business services are
"compet[ing] fiercely with small and regional law firms." Mary C. Daly, The Structure of
Legal Education and the Legal Profession, Multidisciplinary Practice, Competition, and
Globalization,52 J. LEGAL EDUC. 480, 485 (2002). But see Carol M. S~nchez & Patrick E.
Mears, How the Mid-Sized Survive, 11 Bus. L. TODAY, Sept./Oct. 2001, at 45 (noting
increased competitive pressure on mid-sized firms but opining that such firms can remain
competitive by adopting Softer firm culture thereby attracting top legal talent at lower
cost), available at http://www.abanet.org/buslaw/blt (on file with the North Carolina Law
Review).
In-house counsel jobs used to be perceived as bastions of Softness for those who
could not make it in law firms, but in recent years the quality and variety of legal work
done in-house has increased dramatically and the prestige of in-house lawyers has risen
along with it. See Conley, supra note 70, at 1997-98. Not surprisingly, the demands on inhouse lawyers have increased proportionately. See id. at 2009.
76. See Roger C. Cramton, The Current State of the Law Curriculum, 32 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 321, 328 (1982) (criticizing prevalence of the "avuncular Socratic method" in which
professors lecture after making pretense of asking questions); Robert M. Lloyd,
Consumerism in Legal Education,45 J. LEGAL EDUC. 551, 555 (1995) (describing a similar
phenomenon as well as increasing use of lectures).
77. See Christian C. Day, Law Schools Can Solve the "Bar Pass Problem"--"Do the
Work!", 40 CAL. W. L. REV. 321, 344 (2004) (stating that The Princeton Review advises
"using commercial outlines from Day One, avoid briefing cases, and preparing only for the
final exam"). While one might argue that the fact that The PrincetonReview recommends
this practice is not evidence that it is actually successful, the continued prosperity of its
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of all the cases and answers to all of the problems circulate at most
law schools78 and there is little acknowledgment of the ethical or

pedagogical problems these present.

At my own institution, the

Student Bar Association, the school's student government, openly

solicits and distributes these materials.
In many courses, even this minimal preparation is no longer
To avoid the frustration and
required on a daily basis.
embarrassment of dealing with poorly-prepared students, many

professors have gone to a system whereby students are told in
advance who will be called on each day and for which material they
will be held responsible.7 9

Because of these things, students do not find it necessary to be
engaged while they are in class, which they often attend only because
attendance is required. Professors at a number of law schools have
complained that students use their laptops to play solitaire or surf the
Internet during class.8' One professor at another law school told me
students there routinely watch DVD movies on their laptops during
class. When he asked one of them how they dealt with the fact the
movies last longer than the classes, the student replied that they just
paused the movie between classes.
A major catalyst for this Softening is law schools' reliance on

publisher indicates that students do not think they are suffering by taking its advice.
78. Dorothy H. Evensen, To Group or Not to Group: Students' Perceptions of
Collaborative Learning Activities in Law School, 28 S. ILL. U. L.J. 343, 384 (2004)
(describing transmission of course outlines). Many outlines and sets of class notes
circulate via the Internet. See, e.g., 4LawSchool Case Briefs Bank, at http://www.
4lawschool.com/contracts/contracts.htm (last visited Feb 5, 2005) (offering case briefs of
commonly-taught contracts cases) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review); Mike
Shecket's Notes on Dawson, Harvey, and Henderson's Contracts, at http://lawschool.
mikeshecket.com/contracts/casebooknotes.html (last visited Feb. 5, 2005) (providing notes
to accompany the reading of a popular contracts case book) (on file with the North
Carolina Law Review).
79. Variations of this method are common at the school where I teach, and it is my
understanding that they are common at many other law schools as well.
80. See John Schwartz, Professors Vie With Web for Class's Attention, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 2, 2003, at Al. The article quotes Ian Ayres as saying: "When you see 25 percent of
the screens playing solitaire, besides its being distracting, you feel like a sucker for paying
attention." Id. It also reports how a professor at another law school climbed a ladder to
disconnect the wireless transmitter in his classroom. Id. Another solution may be banning
or threatening to ban laptop use in the classroom altogether. For example, several Duke
Law School professors' course syllabi prohibit laptop use, while others explicitly warn that
activities such as instant messaging and playing video games may result in revocation of inclass computer privileges. See Course Homepages, at http://www.law.duke.edu/curriculum/
courseHomepagesSpring.html (last visited Feb. 13, 2005) (on file with the North Carolina
Law Review).
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student evaluations in hiring, tenuring, and compensating faculty.8'

This creates tremendous pressure to dumb down courses82 to avoid
upsetting those students who do not want to have to work and who
will blame the professor's teaching if the material is too hard for them
to understand on the first reading. In fact, it starts a general race to
the bottom to become less demanding.83
Part of the reason that administrators continue to rely on student
evaluations is that they have closed their eyes to the economic reality

of the way students perceive legal education. Administrators base
their thinking on a model where the student is a customer, buying an
education with her money.' Using this model allows administrators
to believe that by giving the customers what they want, they (the
administrators) are doing their jobs. In fact, however, most law
students are not in law school to get an education. They are in law
school to get a credential. They are paying for it in part with money,
but the major cost of the credential is the work they do over the three
years of law school.85 For the typical law student, the way to
maximize utility is to get a degree with the highest possible grades
while doing the least possible work. Like all economic models, this
one oversimplifies. There are students, a small minority, whose goal
is to get the best possible education, and most students will take a few
81. See Jordan, supra note 69, at 42 (referring to law school student evaluations as a
"popularity contest" and stating that some very good teachers have been denied tenure
because they were unpopular with students). The same thing is of course occurring at the
undergraduate level. See Robin Wilson, New Research Casts Doubt on Value of Student
Evaluations of Professors, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Jan. 16, 1998, available at
http://chronicle.com/colloquy/98/evaluation/background.htm (on file with the North
Carolina Law Review).
82. These have been referred to as "lite" versions of the courses. "The manner of
presentation was spiced up for the TV generation." GLENDON, supra note 42, at 202; see
also Philip C. Kissam, The Decline of Law School Professionalism,134 U. PA. L. REV. 251,
273-74 (1986) (claiming that student evaluations reward those who spoon feed and
discourage teaching analytical skills).
Reports of studies of teaching evaluations at the undergraduate level "say
professors who want high ratings have learned that they must dumb down material, inflate
grades, and keep students entertained." Wilson, supra note 81.
83. Professor Glendon relates that a Wall Street Journalarticle reported on professors
hiring professional joke writers in an effort to improve their student evaluations.
GLENDON, supra note 42, at 202.
84. See RosOVSKY & HARTLEY, supra note 65, at 9-10.
85. See Lloyd, supra note 76, at 551-52. Eighty years earlier, Thorstein Veblen
discussed the same problem from a slightly different perspective. He saw universities as
setting up course requirements and grades in order to coerce performance from "a large
body of students, many of whom have little abiding interest in their academic work,
beyond the academic credits necessary to be accumulated for honourable dischargeindeed their scholastic interest may fairly be said to centre in unearned credits."
THORSTEIN VEBLEN, THE HIGHER LEARNING IN AMERICA 103 (1918).
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challenging courses because they think what they learn will be useful
in practice.8 6 Nevertheless the best-credential-for-the-least-effort
model approximates reality far better than the conventional model,
and as long as administrators base their decisions on the conventional
model, they are going to encourage faculty to make courses less
challenging.
The primary brake keeping this system from going out of control
is the bar exam. In most states, the bar exam tests heavily on subjects
like commercial law, evidence and business associations. 87 For many
students, the need to take these courses for the bar exam is all that
makes them improve their analytical skills after they make it through
the first year. Ironically, the traditional bar exam is under attack on
the ground that it does not test real-world skills.8 8 The truth is that
86. In fairness, I should point out that many more students would fill their schedules
with intellectually challenging courses were it not for the fact that their future
opportunities are so dependent upon their class ranks. Even students who want to get the
best possible education are under pressure to take Soft courses to remain competitive.
87. A study of recent Texas bar examinations posted on the St. Mary's University
website lists the law school courses most heavily tested on the Texas Bar Examination.
Evidence is listed as the most tested subject, comprising 8.5% of the examination.
Business Associations is tied for third place with 6.66%. Sales and Secured Transactions is
listed as comprising 3.33%, as is Commercial Paper. If the two courses were combined
into Commercial Law, as they are at many schools, that course would also be tied for third
place with 6.66%.
Relationship of Courses to the Texas Bar Examination,
http://www.stmarytx.edu/law/docs/RelofCourses.pdf (last visited Feb. 5, 2005) (on file with
the North Carolina Law Review). My own review of forty-eight Tennessee essay
questions asked on the last four bar examinations reprinted in the most recent Tennessee
bar review publication showed that ten questions were based entirely or in substantial part
on material normally covered in Commercial Law courses and eight were based entirely or
in substantial part on material covered in Business Associations courses. Other states'
exams appear to be similar. See, e.g., Georgia National Bar Examination Information,
http://www.lexisone.com/legalresearch/legalguide[bar-association-resources/state bar exa
ms/georgia-bar exam.htm (last visited Feb. 5, 2005) (listing Evidence and Sales as subjects
tested on the Multi-State Bar Examination and listing as subjects covered on the Georgia
essay examination three Commercial Law subjects (Commercial Paper, Secured
Transactions, and Sales) and three Business Associations subjects (Agency, Partnerships,
and Corporations) as well as all multi-state subjects) (on file with the North Carolina Law
Review); New York National Bar Examination Information, http://www.lexisone.com/
legalresearch/legalguidelbar association-resources/state-bar exams/new-york-barexam.
htm (last visited Feb. 5, 2005) (listing Evidence and Sales as subjects tested on the MultiState Bar Examination and listing as subjects covered on the New York essay examination
two Commercial Law subjects (Commercial Paper and Secured Transactions) and three
Business Associations subjects (Agency, Partnership, and Corporations) as well as New
York distinctions for all multi-state subjects) (on file with the North Carolina Law
Review).
88. According to one law school dean, "the [bar] examination is both misguided in
what it purports to do, and pernicious in its effects." See Kristin Booth Glen, Thinking
Out of the Bar Exam Box: A Proposalto "MacCrate" Entry to the Profession, 23 PACE L.
REV. 343, 349 (2003); see also Andrea A. Curcio, A Better Bar. Why and How the Existing
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for many law students the bar exam is the only thing that makes them
learn what they need to know in order to practice law in the real
world. 9 Unfortunately, however, there is no guarantee that courses
on bar-tested subjects will require students to analyze cases and

problems rather than merely memorize rules. While professors who
teach these subjects are not under pressure to keep course
enrollments up, they still have to be concerned about student
evaluations.
Another factor working to Harden law schools is the oftenmaligned9" U.S. News rankings of law schools. Although school
administrators claim the ratings are irrelevant 9' (all the time working
like Enron executives to make their numbers look better),92 the fact
Bar Exam Should Change, 81 NEB. L. REV. 363, 364-65 (2002) (noting that a number of
skills required to practice law are not tested for on bar examinations); Trina Grillo, AntiEssentialism and Intersectionality: Tools to Dismantle the Master's House, 10 BERKELEY
WOMEN'S L.J. 16, 28-29 (1995) (arguing against the discriminatory nature of the bar
examination); Joan Howarth, Teaching in the Shadow of the Bar, 31 U.S.F. L. REV. 927,
930 (1997) (collecting critiques of the bar examination); Society of American Law Teachers
Statement on the Bar Exam, July 2002, 52 J. LEGAL EDUC. 446, 446 (2002) (asserting that
bar examinations fail to measure professional competence).
89. As one experienced law teacher and administrator put it: "[B]ar examiners do
effective and critical jobs of protecting the public from graduates who have not mastered
the basics necessary to practice law." Day, supra note 77, at 324. Professor Day goes on
to say: "Law school educators have not been guardians of the public interest. Indeed,
most do not see their charge as that-they leave it up to the bar examiners. Law school
faculty know that it is almost impossible to flunk out of most law schools." Id. at 332.
90. An article in the ABA Journalsaid the opposition to the rankings has "taken on
the force of a jihad." Terry Carter, Rankled by the Rankings, A.B.A. J., Mar. 1998, at 46.
91. More than ninety percent of the deans of ABA accredited law schools have signed
a letter denouncing the rankings. Nicholas Thompson, The Best, The Top, The Most, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 3, 2003, at 4A-24.
92. Under the heading "Cooking the Books to Get Ahead," a reporter for the ABA
Journal revealed a "little-noted scandal in which a number of law schools gave inflated
figures to U.S. News that differed from those they submitted to the ABA's accrediting
offices." Carter, supra note 90, at 50 (emphasis added). The article also reports that one
law school publicized the fact that it had moved up a tier in the rankings when in fact there
had been no substantive change in that particular school's data, but only a change in the
way the rankings grouped the schools. Id. at 48.
The shenanigans are not limited to law schools. In one poll, seven percent of
university presidents admitted deliberately downgrading competing institutions when
rating them for U.S. News. Thompson, supra note 91. Moreover, the U.S. News survey is
not the only survey in which schools attempt to manipulate their rankings. After one
college was listed in the Princeton Review survey as one of the twenty colleges with the
least religious activity, its president sent an email to deans suggesting they encourage
students to respond to the next survey with statements that they pray frequently. See id.
Attempting to make things look better than they are is of course not a new
phenomenon. In 1918, Thorstein Veblen wrote:
Under existing circumstances of rivalry among these institutions of learning, there
is need of much shrewd management to make all the available forces of the
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remains that the ratings provide the primary incentive for schools to
make their students and faculty accountable. The effect of the
rankings goes far beyond administrators' egos.93 Administrators
know that the rankings are a key factor in students' choices of law
schools and that schools which drop in the rankings will see a decline
in the number and quality of their applicants. Rankings can also
affect the job prospects of the schools' graduates.94
Just as competition Hardened American business9 5 and Vietnam
Hardened the armed forces, 9 6 the rankings have the potential to
Harden law schools. Already, some law schools have started to
impose discipline that would otherwise be unthinkable. Schools with
low bar passage rates have been willing to flunk out students who
show they cannot perform in law school.97 Other schools have been
willing to push students into more demanding courses to increase bar
passage rates and to give merit-based financial aid to attract better
students.9 8
establishment count toward the competitive end; and in this composition it is the
part of worldly wisdom to see that appearances may often be of graver
consequence than achievement-as is true in all competitive business that
addresses its appeal to a large and scattered body of customers.
VEBLEN, supra note 85, at 105.
93. The New York Times quoted former University of Pittsburgh law school Dean
Peter Shane as saying that the school's fall in the rankings one year and rise the next "was
treated as an enormous crisis, and then an enormous victory." Thompson, supra note 91.
Although there appears to be no reported instance of anything similar occurring
at the law school level, the trustees of Virginia Commonwealth University have promised
the university president a $25,000 raise if the university moves up a tier in the U.S. News
rankings. Id.
94. One study indicated that the average first-tier law school had nearly four times as
many employer members of the National Association of Law Placement ("NALP")
recruiting on campus as the average second-tier school. Third-tier schools had three times
as many NALP recruiters as fourth-tier schools. Russell Korobkin, In Praise of Law
School Rankings: Solutions to Coordination and Collective Action Problems, 77 TEX. L.
REV. 403, 411 (1998).
Recruiters who recruit at business schools openly admit that they choose the
schools at which they will recruit on the basis of the rankings in various national
publications. See Thomas Lee, Olin School's Dean Presses for Prestige, ST. LOUIS POSTDISPATCH, Oct. 20, 2002, at El.
95. See BARONE, supra note 1, at 76-94.
96. See id. at 132-41.
97. Chris Day has recommended that law schools "bite the bullet" and flunk out
students who are unlikely to pass the bar. He recommends this not because it will help the
schools' rankings, but because it is the best thing for students-delivering the message
early before they spend more time and money pursuing a career for which they are
unsuited. Day, supra note 77, at 347.
98. See Thompson, supra note 91. Anecdotal evidence indicates that most schools are
steering students into courses tested heavily on the bar exam through informal counseling,
while a few are simply increasing the number of required courses. Chris Day has urged
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So far, however, no law school seems to have taken the
aggressive approach that some undergraduate institutions have taken.
Many undergraduate programs have cut back significantly on needbased financial aid in order to devote large amounts of money to
attracting top students with merit-based scholarships.99 By doing so,
they have created a stronger core of students and the opportunity to
give them a more rigorous education. 10 0 One survey showed that over

a period of seven years the amount of money devoted to merit
scholarships at the nation's four-year colleges and universities
increased by 152%, while the amount devoted to need-based grants

rose by fifty-nine percent, only slightly more than the increases in
tuition.10 '
While the rankings and the bar exam will have their effects, it is

market forces that in the long run are most likely to Harden legal
education. The present situation offers a great opportunity, and some
enterprising school is likely to seize that opportunity before too many
years pass. If a school were to adopt higher standards and develop a
reputation for turning out graduates willing and able to perform at
the level law firms demand, the school's graduates would fare well in
the job market. That, in turn, would allow the school to attract better
applicants and thereby to toughen its standards even more. The
school's success would cause other schools to toughen their standards
in the same way New York's success against crime forced other cites
to Harden their law enforcement programs."
schools to encourage their students to take these courses so that the students will not risk
the personal consequences of failing the bar exam. Day, supra note 77, at 343.
99. Stuart Silverstein, Ivy League Gets a Run for Its Money on Top Seniors, L.A.
TIMES, May 11, 2004, at Al.
100. See id.
101. See id.; Marcella Bombardieri, Needy Students Miss Out, BOSTON GLOBE, Apr.
25, 2004, at Al (reporting that during the same period tuition and fees rose fifty percent).
Schools have also offered some unusual perks to attract good students, including
guaranteed admission to medical school (subject to meeting certain academic
requirements) and guaranteed parking. Silverstein, supra note 99.
An attractive byproduct of the competition for top students is that students who
excel in academics are beginning to get a little of the attention formerly reserved for
athletes. Ironically, some people are criticizing the efforts to use merit-based scholarships
to attract good students, see Silverstein, supra note 99, and many of the critics are faculty
and administrators at other universities-universities that spend millions of dollars in
scholarship money trying to attract the best athletes.
102. See BARONE, supra note 1, at 101 (noting that voters in other cities demanded
results similar to those in New York). It might be that no traditional law school within
striking distance of the top tier could muster the consensus necessary to effect such a
dramatic change. Anecdotal evidence indicates that many law deans are aware of the
need to Harden their programs but are unable to overcome faculty resistance. For an
example of such a call for Hardening by a law school dean, see generally Donald J.
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A less desirable effect of market forces would be corporations
and law firms outsourcing more work to India and elsewhere. This
has already begun on a small scale. General Electric Corporation
estimates that its small legal department in India has saved GE more
than $2 million in legal fees that would otherwise have gone to
American lawyers. 103 There are at least two companies in business for

the express purpose of providing Indian outsourcing for American
law firms. 1°' One of these companies is headed by an Indian national
who was formerly a partner in a large law firm in the United States." 5
A market research firm has predicted that by 2015, more than 489,000
0 6 Another consultant
American lawyer jobs will have moved abroad."
estimates that twenty to twenty-five percent of all American legal

work could shift abroad.107 Some of this may be inevitable, simply
because of the cost differential, but if foreign lawyers prove
themselves to have better skills than American lawyers, the trend is
10 8
sure to accelerate.
Weidner, The Crises of Legal Education: A Wake-Up Callfor Faculty, 47 J. LEGAL EDUC.
92, 95-103 (1997). But there will be no faculty governance issues to impede the high
quality proprietary law schools which are sure to spring up when the American Bar
Association is finally forced to abandon its antiquated rules on distance education. These
institutions may be what ultimately breaks the cycle of Softening in American law schools.
103. Jennifer Fried, Law Departments Cut Costs By Sending Patent Work Abroad, PAT.
STRATEGY & MGMT., Feb. 16, 2004, at 5.
104. Websites for the companies are available at http://www.mindcrest.com (last visited
Feb. 7, 2005) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review) and http://www.lexadigm.com
(last visited Feb. 7, 2005) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
105. Ganesh Natarajan, President and CEO of Mindcrest, Inc. was formerly a partner
in McGuireWoods LLP. He holds a Bachelors degree from the University of Bombay, an
M.B.A. from Brigham Young and a J.D. from Washington University in St. Louis. See
http://www.mindcrest.com/who.html (last visited Feb. 7, 2005) (on file with the North
Carolina Law Review).
106. Jennifer Fried, Foreign Outside Counsel.: Law Departments Cut Costs By Sending
Work Abroad, N.Y. L.J., Jan. 22, 2004, at 5. Business Week is more conservative,
estimating that 14,000 legal jobs will move offshore in 2005 and that the total moved
offshore will reach 75,000 in 2015. See LOMAR News Briefs, LAW OFFICE MGMT. &
ADMIN. REP., May, 2003, at 8. Even these numbers, however, will have a huge impact.
Accredited law schools in the United States graduate an average of almost 40,000 students
a year, so 75,000 jobs represents almost two years' production of law graduates. See J.D.
Degrees 1984-2002, http://www.abanet.org/legaled/statistics/jd.html (last visited Feb. 12,
2005) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
107. Geanne Rosenberg, Offshore Legal Work Continues to Make Gains; Ethics and
Malpracticeare Among the Key Issues that May Arise in Outsourcing,NAT'L L.J., Mar. 29,
2004, at S3.
108. A Wall Street Journalarticle reported that German companies, long respected for
their engineering prowess, have begun sending engineering work to China. The article
lays part of the blame on the "lagging German education system." Matthew Karnitschnig,
Vaunted German Engineers Face Competition from China, WALL ST. J., July 15, 2004, at
Al.
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Barone explains how businesses and many governmental
institutions reacted to similar threats by Hardening themselves. It
remains a question whether law schools will do the same. Much as
they try to insulate themselves, law schools are part of a market
economy, and they are being drawn deeper into it. In one of the most
quoted passages in economics literature, Joseph Schumpeter says:
Capitalism ... is by nature a form or method of economic
change and not only never is but never can be stationary....
The fundamental impulse that sets and keeps the capitalist
engine in motion comes from the new consumers' goods, the
new methods of production or transportation, the new markets,
the new forms of industrial organization that capitalist
enterprise creates.
...This process of Creative Destruction is the essential fact
about capitalism. It is what capitalism consists in and what
every capitalist concern has got to live in.109
The practice of law has evolved. Most of us wish it had not
evolved in the way it has,"' but we do not have the luxury of ignoring
reality. If law schools fail to evolve to meet the needs of current legal
practice reality, new forms of institutions will evolve to replace us. It
remains to be seen whether some entrepreneurial law school will take
the lead in transforming the way we go about our business, as
Harvard did in the 1880s,"' or whether American law schools will
continue their slide into insignificance.' 1 2

109. SCHUMPETER, supra note 23, at 82-83.
110. Not everyone agrees that the changes have been for the worse. According to
Richard Posner, "The increase in competition has forced lawyers to serve their clients
better and so to rely less on mystique and more on specialized knowledge that has genuine
value to the client." See RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMATICS OF MORAL AND
LEGAL THEORY 191 (1999).
111. See ROBERT STEVENS, LAW SCHOOL: LEGAL EDUCATION IN AMERICA FROM

THE 1850S TO THE 1980S, 35-42 (1983); Anthony Chase, The Birth of the Modern Law
School, 23 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 329, 332 (1979); cf. Daly, supra note 75, at 482-83
(predicting that competition from online institutions will require law schools to make

drastic curricular changes).
112. For an iconoclastic comparison of the decline of the mystique and professionalism
of the legal profession to the decline of the medieval guilds, see generally Richard A.
Posner, The Material Basis of Jurisprudence,69 IND. L.J. 1 (1993).

